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Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly used to provide infrastructure services. Even though
PPPs have the potential to increase efficiency and improve resource allocation, contract renegotiations
have been pervasive.
We show that existing accounting standards allow governments to renegotiate PPP contracts and elude
spending limits. Our model of renegotiations leads to observable predictions: (i) in a competitive market,
firms lowball their offers, expecting to break even through renegotiation, (ii) renegotiations compensate
lowballing and pay for additional expenditure, (iii) governments use renegotiation to increase spending
and shift the burden of payments to future administrations, and (iv) there are significant renegotiations
in the early stages of  the contract, e.g. during construction. We use data on Chilean renegotiations
of PPP contracts to examine these predictions and find that the evidence is consistent with the predictions
of our model. Finally, we show that if PPP investments are counted as current government spending,
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1 Introduction
Private participation in infrastructure provision has increased dramatically since the
early 1990s via public-private partnerships (PPPs).2,3 For example, the average annual
value of 22.9 billion Euros for PPP projects signed in Europe between 2002 and 2006 was
three times the annual average over the preceding decade.4 In the United States, where
until recently PPPs played a smaller role than in many European countries, ﬁnancing of
transportation infrastructure via PPPs increased almost tenfold, on an annual basis, be-
tween 2006-2008 and the preceding decade (1996-2005).5 Similarly, investment in PPPs
indevelopingcountriesgrewatanaverageannualrateof28.3%between1990and1997,
followed by a slowdown after the East-Asian crisis, and a new growth spurt beginning in
2003, reaching 114.3 billion dollars during 2006.6
OneofthereasonsforthepopularityofPPPsisthatgovernmentscansimultaneously
attract private ﬁrms and claim that they are not privatizing. Independently of these po-
2A rich set of acronyms describe speciﬁc PPP arrangements, including BLT, BLTM, BOT, DBOT, DBFO,
DBFO/M, JV and ROT. The B usually stands for build, the L for lease, the R for rehabilitate, the T for trans-
fer, the O for operate, the D for design, the F for ﬁnance, and the M for manage. JV stands for “joint
venture”. See Grimsey and Lewis (2005) and chapter 1 in Guasch (2004).
3Infrastructure that has been provided via PPPs include roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, ports, air-
ports, air trafﬁc control systems, water and sanitation plants, hospitals, schools, prisons, and social hous-
ing.
4Several European countries have well established PPP programs that account for 20% of public in-
vestment between 2001 and 2006, see Blanc-Brude et al. (2007). One of these programs is the United
Kingdom’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI) mentioned above in the quote from the Economist.
5The projects (with ﬁnancing in million dollars followed by the year of notice to proceed, in parenthe-
sis) are the following: Pennsylvania Turnpike (12,300; 2008), Texas SH 130 (1,350; 2007), Indiana Toll Road
(3,850; 2006), Virginia’s Pocahontas Parkway (611; 2006), Chicago Skyway (1,830; 2005), California’s SR 125
(773; 2003), Jamaica-JFK Airtrain (930; 1999), New Jersey’s Trenton River Light Rail (604; 1999), Camino
Colombia Bypass in Texas (85; 1999), JFK Terminal 4 (689; 1997) and New Jersey’s Hudson-Bergen Light
Rail (1674; 1996). Source: Public Work Financing, October 2007.
6Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. These amounts do not correspond to the ex-
act concept of public-private partnerships, but constitute a reasonable (and the best available) proxy for
developing countries.
1litical reasons, PPPs have the potential to increase efﬁciency and improve resource allo-
cation.7 Nevertheless, experience has revealed several pitfalls of PPPs.
OneoftheproblemswithPPPsisthatrenegotiationsofcontractsarepervasive. Guasch
(2004) examined nearly 1,000 Latin American concession contracts awarded between
the mid 1980s and 2000, and found that 30% of all contracts were renegotiated. The pro-
portion reaches 54.4% in the transportation sector (roads, ports, tunnels and airports)
and 74.4% in the water sector.8 Guasch also ﬁnds that renegotiations often favor the
concessionaire. For example, in 62% of the cases they led to tariff increases, in 38% to
extensions of the concession term and in 62% to reductions in investment obligations.
Renegotiations are also pervasive in developed countries, see Gómez Ibáñez and Meyer
(1993).
What is the reason for frequent renegotiations? Industry participants claim that cir-
cumstances change over the life of a concession, which usually last many decades. Ac-
cording to this explanation, renegotiations are due to the long term, incomplete nature
of PPP contracts. However, this explanation ignores thatrenegotiations often occur dur-
ing the construction phase, shortly after contracts are awarded. For example, Guasch
(2004, Table 6.4) reports an average of just 2.2 years between the concession award and
the ﬁrst renegotiation.
In this paper we show that renegotiations of PPP contracts can be used by govern-
ments to circumvent budgetary constraints. In our model an incumbent that spends
more on infrastructure is more likely to be reelected. This creates a bias towards antic-
ipating infrastructure spending relative to its welfare maximizing allocation over time.
We assume that under conventional provision, i.e., when the government hires a con-
struction company to build infrastructure but controls the project thereafter, caps on
spending or on net ﬁscal debt are effective in controlling this bias. By contrast, we show
that because of defective ﬁscal accounting standards, renegotiations of PPP contracts
can be used to elude spending caps.
Essentially, because PPP arrangements bundle ﬁnance and construction, the ﬁrm
can“lend”tothegovernmentbyrenegotiatingthecontractinreturnforpaymentsmade
by future administrations. Under current ﬁscal accounting rules neither the additional
investments that take place after renegotiations, nor the future obligations assumed by
7See, for example, Hart (2003), Bentz et al. (2005), Bennet and Iossa (2006), and Martimort and Pouyet
(2008).
8It is worth noting that Guasch’s data base underestimates the prevalence of renegotiations due to cen-
soring. For example, his data includes several Chilean concessions which at the time had not yet been
renegotiated, but which have been repeatedly renegotiated since 2000 (see section 3 below).
2the government in a renegotiation are accounted for in the budget. This suggests that
the solution to the spending bias is to ensure that PPP assets are counted as public in-
vestments at the moment they are built.
Our model has four observable implications: First, under competition for the con-
tract, ﬁrms lowball their offers, expecting to get even in later renegotiations. Second,
additional works are included in the renegotiation of the contract. Third, major rene-
gotiations occur shortly after the award of the contract. Fourth, an important fraction
of the costs of renegotiation are not borne by the current administration. We compile
information on the 50 concessions awarded in Chile between 1993 and 2006 and show
that it is consistent with these predictions.9 Total investment increased via renegotia-
tion from $8.4 billion to $11.3 billion, i.e., by nearly one-third. Most of the increase (83%
of the total amount) was the result of 78 bilateral renegotiations, while the rest were de-
cisions of arbitration panels.10 For the $2.3 billion awarded in bilateral renegotiations,
we ﬁnd that only 35% of the additional cost was paid by the administration that rene-
gotiated. Of that $2.3 billion, 84% corresponds to payments for additional works, while
the remaining 16% correspond to additional payments for works included in the origi-
nal contract. Of the total, 78% was awarded during the construction phase. Finally, we
observe that even though speciﬁc provisions in the concessions law limit the amounts
that can be renegotiated, these limits are routinely exceeded.11
Our paper adds to the evidence on renegotiations and PPPs; see Guasch (2004);
GuaschandStraub(2006)andGuaschetal.(2006, 2007and2008). Wealsocontributeto
the literature on soft budgets.12 In the standard mechanism, developed by Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995), the “center” lends and sinks money into a ﬁrm in period 1. Because
assets are sunk, in period 2 the center wants to bail out the ﬁrm. Thus, the dynamic in-
consistency problem brought about by the inability to commit not to bail out the ﬁrm
softens the budget. In our model, by contrast, there is no time inconsistency problem,
as the government does not face a commitment problem, and wants to renegotiate. The
budget constraint is soft because a renegotiation allows the incumbent to elude spend-
9The Chilean concession program is considered among a handful of well established PPP programs
(Hemming, 2005), solidly based in the Law, with well speciﬁed conﬂict resolution procedures (IMF, 2005).
Detailed data on concession contracts are available on the webpage of the Ministry of Public Works and
the quality of ﬁscal accounting can be described at par with average OECD levels.
10According to the Chilean Concession Law, when the ﬁrm and regulator are unable to reach an agree-
ment in a bilateral negotiation, the ﬁrm (and only the ﬁrm) can bring the case to an arbitration panel.
11This is noteworthy since international indicators (World Bank Governance Indicators and World Eco-
nomic Forum Global Competitiveness Report) indicate that the quality of regulations in Chile are above
the OECD average.
12See Kornai et al. (2003) for a synthesis of this literature.
3ing limits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes our argument and
derives some observable implications. Section 3 presents evidence from the Chilean
PPP program on these observable implications. This is followed by the conclusion and
an appendix with an extension of the model.
2 A simple model of renegotiations
2.1 Model
There are two periods, each corresponding to the term of one administration. There is
an election at the end of the ﬁrst period. The discount rate is zero and social welfare is
U Æu(I1)Åu(I2), (1)
where u is strictly increasing and strictly concave and It denotes the ability to provide
infrastructure services in period t.13 The construction industry and the PPP industry
are competitive, infrastructure fully depreciates in one period and each unit of capacity
costs $1 and is costless to operate.
InfrastructuremustbeﬁnancedwithanexogenoussequenceoftaxesTi thatsatisﬁes
T1ÅT2 Æ1, (2)
so that the budget constraint is
I1ÅI2 Æ1. (3)
That is, over time infrastructure spending cannot exceed 1.14 The following result fol-
lows immediately:
Result 1 Is
1 characterized by u0(Is
1) Æ u0(1¡ Is
1) maximizes (1) subject to (3). It follows




13In addition to decreasing returns to infrastructure, there are other reasons for concavity of utility. For
example, if there are no alternative suppliers to the ﬁrms already operating in the country (assuming
that it is costly —e.g., takes too long— to invite additional international ﬁrms), increasing investment
leads to more market power of the ﬁrms, so it is inefﬁcient to bunch most investments in the ﬁrst period.
Alternatively, input (materials and specialized labor) costs go up when most investment takes place in the
ﬁrst period, again leading to higher prices.
14It is straightforward to extend the model to include user fee revenue, but this would add little to the
analysis in this paper.
4program is feasible.
Congress wants to maximize social welfare (1) and can impose a spending cap ¯ I1.15
The government can issue debt in period 1, constrained by (2) and the spending cap
imposed by Congress. The incumbent executive has a reelection concern: if p is the
probability of reelection, her payoff is
G(I1,I2)Æu(I1)Åp(I1)u(I2), (4)
where p is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and u È 0, so that p(I1)u(I2) is in-
creasing in I1 for any ﬁxed value of I2. Note that the incumbent’s preferences coincide
withsocialwelfareinperiod1,butthatshevaluesperiod’s2welfareonlywheninpower.
What is the rationale for the incumbent’s objective function (4)? The probability of
reelection may increase with infrastructure spending because voters are irrational and
prefer investments now, before the election.16 An alternative interpretation comes from
thepoliticaleconomyliterature. Hillman(1982),suggeststhatgovernmentschoosepoli-
cies by balancing the political beneﬁts of support from industry (through campaign
contributions) against the dissatisfaction of consumers from inefﬁcient investments.
Higher industry proﬁts are exchanged in return for political contributions, which raises
the probability of reelection, but also increases the welfare loss and, therefore, the dis-
satisfaction of voters. It is straightforward to see that in a neighborhood of Is
1 Æ 1
2 the
welfare loss to consumers will be second order while the beneﬁt for the incumbent of
increased political support is ﬁrst order; it follows that I1 will be larger than Is
1 in equi-
librium.
2.1.1 Conventional provision vs. public-private partnerships
There are two alternative ways of procuring infrastructure: conventional provision and
public-private partnerships. In both cases Congress grants an authorization to the gov-
ernment to spend at most ¯ I1 Æ Is
1 Æ 1
2 in period 1 (see Figure 1 for a time-line). This
15The assumption that Congress’ and society’s interests coincide seems contrary to experience. It is
based on the fact that in Congress there is an opposition party that reacts against increased (federal)
spendingwithreelectionpurposes,whereastheexecutivehasnocorrespondingopposition. Thepowerof
the purse is the main source of power of Congress in democratic societies, and it is active only in opposi-
tion to government. Our point is that Congress’ oversight on electoral spending tends to reduce excesses,
though it is probably still not optimal. In this sense, our simpliﬁcation is analogous to assuming that the
less risk averse party in a standard principal-agent problem is risk neutral.
16Cadot et al. (2006) present a model of pork-barrel infrastructure spending where future voters are not
represented in the current election
5constraint can be interpreted in two ways. In the ﬁrst interpretation, the services of in-
frastructure provided in period 1 cannot exceed I1 Æ 1
2, this is the “services limit” inter-
pretation. In the second interpretation, actual expenditures on infrastructure in period
1cannotexceed 1
2,thisisthe“expenditurelimit”interpretation. Bothinterpretationsare
not equivalent when the infrastructure contracted in period 1 is partly paid for in period
2, as will be the case under PPPs. Nevertheless the insight and result we derive below
hold, with minor modiﬁcations, for both cases.
The speciﬁcs of expenditure oversight vary from country to country. In some coun-
tries infrastructure projects must pass a social cost-beneﬁt evaluation. In other coun-
tries,PPPprojectsmustpassavalue-for-moneytestwhichcomparescostswithconven-
tional provision.17 In these cases the “services limit” interpretation for the spending cap
is appropriate. Yet in other countries the public works authority faces spending limits
imposed and enforced by the ﬁnance authority and the “expenditure limit” interpreta-
tion applies.
Following Maskin and Tirole (2008) we assume that PPPs make hidden intertem-
poral transfers possible. That is, because PPPs bundle ﬁnance with construction and
operation, the government can make a credible promise to repay in the future for in-
frastructure that ﬁrms build in the present. Furthermore, these promises do not enter
budgetary discussion until the period they are disbursed. By contrast, there is no mech-
anism available to backload payments under conventional provision.
Governments can backload payments under PPPs in a variety of ways other than the
one considered in our model. For example, the government can extend the duration
of the concession contract, raise future user fees, offer additional revenue guarantees,
promise for increases in future subsidies, or lower the quality standards the ﬁrm must
comply with. In all these cases the incumbent is transferring resources, mainly from
future administrations and users, to the ﬁrm, circumventing budgetary control.
Conventionalprovision As mentioned above, Congress grants an authorization to the
government to spend at most Is
1 Æ 1
2. Under conventional provision, the government
then procures I1 Æ 1
2 in a competitive auction and the construction company builds the
project. At the end of period 1 the government collects taxes T1, issues debt D Æ 1
2 ¡T1,
and repays the construction company (see the left panel in Figure 1 for the time-line).18
Note that in period 1, net borrowing D equals 1
2 ¡T1. Hence, under existing budgetary
17There is anecdotal evidence that PPP units understate costs to meet the test.
18In practice, construction companies ﬁnance their operation mainly with short-term bank loans,
which they must repay when the works are completed.
6practicesCongresscanalsoimposeaneffectivelimitbycappingnetborrowingat 1
2¡T1.
Because (3) must hold, I2 Æ1¡I1. Thus, in period 2 the government procures I2 Æ 1
2,
collects taxes T2, pays the construction company and repays debt D. Then the game
ends.
Public-private partnerships Under this contractual relationship, the infrastructure is
ﬁnanced, built and operated by a private ﬁrm. Congress imposes the same spending
cap as in the case of conventional provision, ¯ I1 Æ Is
1 Æ 1
2, and the government allocates
the PPP in a competitive auction where ﬁrms bid for the total payment B they demand
in order to ﬁnance, build and operate the infrastructure ¯ I1. The lowest bidder becomes
the concessionaire, with a contract {B; 1
2}, which entitles him to receive B at the end of
period 1. The expenditure limit interpretation for the spending cap implies that B · 1
2.19
According to the time-line depicted in the right panel of Figure 1, after the PPP con-
tract is signed, but before the infrastructure is built, the incumbent renegotiates and
agrees on an amount ² in additional works in exchange for R in additional payments to
the concessionaire. Part of these payments are made in period 2. Hence, they sign the
new contract {B ÅR; 1
2 Å²} and the concessionaire builds 1
2 Å² units of infrastructure in
period 1, for a total payment of B ÅR.
Below, we determine the equilibrium values for B, R and ². Before doing so it is
instructive to discuss how a renegotiation can be used to elude the spending cap im-
posed by Congress. The timing of payments is important. Denoting by P1 the amount
promised to the ﬁrm in period 1 according to the renegotiated contract, as long as B ·
P1 · 1
2, the spending cap is met and the government’s net borrowing appears to be
D ÆP1¡T1.
Nevertheless, in addition to D the government assumes a contractual commitment to
pay (B ÅR)¡P1 in period 2. Hence, the government’s true net borrowing in period 1 is
[(B ÅR)¡P1]ÅD Æ(B ÅR)¡T1.
In period 2 the contractual obligation appears in the budget and is binding. Hence, the
amount that can be allocated to construction is I2 Æ1¡(B ÅR). At the end of the period,
19The initial contract auctioned by the government could be for more than 1
2, since ﬁrms may bid less
than their cost in the expectation of the proﬁts they will make after the renegotiation. We consider this
possibility later in this section.
7the government collects taxes of T2, pays 1¡(BÅR) to the construction company for the
second period construction, pays (B ÅR)¡P1 to the concessionaire, and repays debt D.
It might appear that direct congressional oversight of PPPs can substitute for bud-
getary accounting, but this does not occur. PPP contracts tend to be renegotiated by the
individualagenciesthatsignedthem,astheyhavetheexpertisetoevaluatethecostsand
beneﬁts of the modiﬁcations. The new obligations are normally ignored by the budget
ofﬁce because they are registered in complex bilateral contracts that are signed when
the renegotiation occurs. Even when the budget ofﬁce has oversight over the negoti-
ation process, Congress may still be ill informed about the obligations. For example,
referring to a related issue, Hemming et al. (2005) point out that in many countries it is
verydifﬁculttoobtaininformationaboutminimumincomeguaranteesprovidedinPPP
contracts, which tend to be granted by individual ministries, and not by the government
budget ofﬁce.
2.2 Soft budgets, renegotiations and PPPs
We now show that an incumbent can exploit PPPs to anticipate spending. First we show
that an unconstrained incumbent would like to spend more than what Congress allows
under conventional provision. Next we show that the incumbent can use renegotiations
to attain her optimum.
2.2.1 Two benchmarks
The unconstrained government Assume a government constrained only by (3). Then





















since u and p are concave and increasing, and u È0.
We now show that I¤
1 È 1
2. To begin, assume that p0 Æ p00 Æ 0, that is, there is a ﬁxed
probability of reelection p 2 [0,1]. Denote the corresponding optimal investment in in-
8frastructure during period 1 by I
p


























2 for p Ç1. This result is well known (see Alesina and Tabellini [1990]):
the incumbent tends to anticipate spending because future infrastructure spending is
discounted by more than the social discount factor.
We return to the ﬁrst order condition (5) with p a function of I. We deﬁne peq as the




























1 denotes optimal government expendi-
ture for a government with constant p equal to p(I¤
1) and we recall that Is
1 Æ 1
2 denotes
socially optimal government expenditure.
Thus, there are two reasons why the current government wants to anticipate spend-
ing. First, the coalition may not be in ofﬁce in the future: p Ç 1 acts as a discount rate
that discounts future utility more than is socially desirable. Second, more spending to-
day increases the probability of reelection. Hence, the government’s expenditure not
only depends on its probability of being re-elected, p(I¤
1), but also on how responsive
this probability is to changes in expenditures. A more responsive probability leads to
higher expenditures, even when the actual probability of being re-elected remains un-
changed.
9Conventional provision Result 1 implies that socially optimal expenditure in period 1
equals 1
2. Under conventional provision Congress implements the optimal sequence of
investments by setting a spending limit ¯ I1 Æ Is
1 Æ 1
2. Since I¤
1 È ¯ I1, this spending limit is
binding.
2.2.2 Implementing the incumbent’s optimum with a renegotiation
Assume that Congress sets a spending cap ¯ I1 Æ 1
2 and that the incumbent auctions a PPP
contract for I1 Æ 1
2. We now show that by renegotiating the PPP contract the government
can anticipate spending and implement her optimum, I¤
1.
As noted before, if the incumbent and the concessionaire agree to ² in additional
works against R in additional revenues, the concessionaire receives B ÅR and spends
1
2 Å². The incumbent, in turn, is left with 1¡(B ÅR) to spend in period 2. Hence after
renegotiation her utility increases to
u(1
2 Å²)Åp(1
2 Å²)u(1¡B ¡R). (6)
Now note that the concessionaire receives a rent R ´ R ¡² when renegotiating. Ratio-
nalexpectationsonthepartofpotentialconcessionairesimpliesthatthisrentwillaffect
bids in the auction for the PPP contract—i.e. it will stimulate lowballing. Denoting the
amount that is lowballed by Á ´ I1¡B Æ 1
2 ¡B we have that competition in the auction
implies that the ﬁrm’s total proﬁt will equal zero. That is, competition eliminates rents
and, therefore, the concessionaire’s lowballing equals her expected gain in the renegoti-
ation.
Result 2 B ÅR Æ I1Å²Æ 1
2 Å² and ÁÆR.
Below, we show that the ﬁrm will renegotiate in order to circumvent the spending
limit imposed by Congress, and in this way achieve its optimum. The main idea is as
follows. Theﬁrmlowballsduringtheauction,intheexpectationofrecoveringthedeﬁcit
during the renegotiation stage. If the ﬁrm lowballs by too much, the maximum rent it
canobtainintherenegotiationstageisinsufﬁcientforittobreakeven. Bycontrast,ifthe
ﬁrm lowballs by too little, the government is willing to pay a large premium (larger than
the amount lowballed) in order to have additional infrastructure. In turn, this excess in
renegotiation rents attract more aggressive bids on the auction. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm
lowballs in the auction by the exact amount it will obtain in renegotiation rents.
10The interesting question is what enables the government to attain its bliss point.
This is due to two facts: competition in the initial stage eliminates ex post rents, plus
the assumption that bargaining is efﬁcient. This last condition implies that, thanks to
the renegotiation, the government’s desired ﬁrst period investment I¤
1 is part of the bar-
gaining frontier, and since the ﬁrm gets nothing overall, the government can achieve its
desired ﬁrst period investment.
To provide formal derivations, it is instructive to consider ﬁrst the cases where one
of the parties has all the bargaining power.
The ﬁrm has all the bargaining power
In this case, the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts subject to maintaining the utility of the
government at the level it would obtain if no renegotiation takes place. It therefore
solves:








Note that the renegotiation allows the incumbent to achieve a debt-like intertempo-
ral transfer. Current infrastructure spending rises by ², at the cost of R.
The ﬁrstorder conditionsfor the problemstated above and some straightforward al-
gebra lead to the following condition for the additional infrastructure contracted during














This condition is equivalent to condition (5) that determines the government’s optimal
investmentschedule. Thereforethegovernmentwillcontractforadditionalworkstothe
amount ²¤ Æ I¤
1 ¡ 1
2 during the renegotiation. We also have that the equilibrium amount








The ﬁrm lowballs by Á¤ during the auction for I1 Æ 1
2, anticipating that it will make ex
11post rents equal to Á¤ when it renegotiates the contract.
The government has all the bargaining power
In this case the government pays the ﬁrm at cost (i.e., without any rents) for any ad-















From the zero proﬁt condition (Result 2) we have that Á Æ 0 in (9). Comparing with (5)
then shows that the government contracts ²¤ Æ I¤
1 ¡ 1
2 during the renegotiation, thereby
implementing its optimum.
The intuition is the following: when making its bid to build I1 Æ 1
2, the ﬁrm is aware
that it will have no bargaining power when renegotiating the contract, and therefore will
not obtain rents that could allow it to recover from any lowballing. For this reason, it
does not lowball and bids B Æ 1
2. It follows that ÁÆ0.
General case
When considering the general case, where both the government and the ﬁrm have
bargaining power during the renegotiation, the intuition is similar to what we discussed
in the case where the ﬁrm has all the bargaining power. The ﬁrm lowballs in the expec-
tation of recovering the ﬁrst period deﬁcit with the renegotiation rents. The proof of the
result is complicated by the fact that the ﬁrm and government measure their utility in
different units, and we present it in the appendix. Here we state the result.
Result 3 Assuming a competitive auction for I1 Æ 1
2 and efﬁcient bargaining during the
renegotiation that follows, in equilibrium the incumbent uses the renegotiation to imple-
ment her optimum, regardless of the distribution of bargaining power. The ﬁrm lowballs











Á¤(0) Æ 0. As long as the ﬁrm has some bargaining power (® È 0), additional spending
12contracted during the renegotiation is used both to pay for the new infrastructure and to
compensate lowballing in the auction.
Proof See the Appendix.
Note that the split of the ex post surplus, and therefore, the ex post rent made by the
concessionaire depends on his bargaining power, ®. Nevertheless, our assumption of ex
antecompetitionintheauctionimpliesthattheconcessionairewillnotmakerentsover-
all, as any ex post rent is a remuneration for ex ante lowballing. This has an interesting
implication: suppose Congress makes it a law that additional works must be awarded
after a competitive auction that forces a competitive price ²¤ for these additional works.
This procedure does not prevent spending anticipation: its only effect is to prevent low-
balling in the initial auction. By imposing no rents during the renegotiation, Congress
shifts all bargaining power to the government during the renegotiation. Nevertheless, as
shown above, the government can attain its optimum nonetheless, since the additional
expenditure on infrastructure is paid for in period 2 and therefore is not subject to the
spending constraint imposed by Congress in period 1.
Second, note that with PPP contracts the initial bid for the project is B Æ 1
2 ¡Á¤, at a
netlossofÁ¤ fortheﬁrm,whiletheamountpaidbythegovernmentintherenegotiation
equals Á¤Å²¤, for infrastructure that is worth ²¤. Thus, if ® È 0, the results of the rene-
gotiation includes additional compensation for the works originally contracted as well
as for additional works not contemplated in the original contract. In other words, “cost
overruns,” which are often cited in practice as the reason for renegotiating, are brought
about endogenously, by initial lowballing.
Third, lowballing implies B Ç 1
2 whenever ®È0. Hence, the government is left with a
ﬁrst period surplus that can be used to pay for the results of renegotiation. Thus, some
of the additional compensation of the concessionaire is paid from the current budget.
Fourth, observe that renegotiations are an effective means of anticipating spending
only if a signiﬁcant part of the amounts renegotiated are not paid by the current ad-
ministration. This is the main prediction of the model.20 The future administration has
1
2 ¡²¤ to spend in period 2 instead of the social optimal 1
2.
We note that we assumed the infrastructure auctioned initially equals the spending
limitimposedbyCongress: I1 Æ 1
2. Thisisoneofmanyauctionsthatlead, afterrenegoti-
20Observe the difference between this prediction and having additional spending by emitting bonds or
borrowing in the market: in the case of PPPs, the lender is the ﬁrm and there is no clear supervision of the
additional spending.
13ation, to the incumbent’s optimal infrastructure level I¤
1. For example, when the spend-
ing cap is interpreted as a limit on expenditures, it is feasible to have I1 È 1
2, coupled to
a winning bid B that does not exceed the spending cap 1
2.21
2.2.3 A suggested solution
Spending anticipation is not inherent to PPPs. Indeed, conventional provision and PPPs
share the same information structure, and have insigniﬁcant differences as far as dele-
gationisconcerned—bothdelegateinfrastructureprocurementinagovernmentagency
which reports directly to the executive, rather than to an independent supervisory body.
Thedifferenceisduetodefectiveaccountingstandards,whichinteractwithtwospeciﬁc
aspects of PPPs.
The ﬁrst characteristic is that PPPs bundle ﬁnance, construction and operation into
one contract, which allows the incumbent to renegotiate all dimensions of the contract
with the concessionaire simultaneously. The second characteristic is that PPP laws and
regulationsimposeconstraintsmainly(inmanycountriesonly)ontheoriginalPPPcon-
tract. As we already mentioned, some countries may require that PPPs pass a social
cost-beneﬁt analysis; others require PPPs to pass a value-for-money test. The constraint
limits the spending by the government (i.e., it sets I1 to the optimal social value Is
1) and




Nevertheless, this problem has a straightforward solution that can be implemented
within existing budgetary practices: the government should count any infrastructure
procured via PPPs as current investment.
To see why this solves the problem, we return to our model. Under the proposed
solution, B ÅR will be registered as government infrastructure spending in period 1,
and the government’s net borrowing will appear to be B ÅR ¡T1. Thus a cap on total
spending B ÅR, or on net borrowing equal to Is
1 ¡T1 would lead to B ÅR · Is
1. In other
words, the reformulated cap forces the government to cut other investments if it wishes
to renegotiate.22
21Result 3 applies to the case where I1 Ç 1
2 as well. In this case, the ﬁrm lowballs by including additional
works (above 1
2) initially, but charges less than 1
2 for it. Deﬁning Á¤(I1) in a manner analogous to what we
did for I1 Æ 1
2, we have that as long as I1 ¡Á¤(I1) · 1
2 the spending limit for period 1 won’t be exceeded
and the renegotiation achieves the incumbent’s optimum. The resulting function Á¤(I1) is decreasing in
I1. Thus, independent of how we interpret the spending cap imposed by Congress, the incumbent uses
renegotiations to circumvent the spending caps and achieve her optimum.
22Engel et al. (2007) study the public ﬁnance of PPPs in a model where incentives play no role, and show
that optimal budgetary accounting of PPPs requires that they appear as a deﬁcit item upfront, indepen-
14Including privately-ﬁnanced assets in the public sector’s balance sheet has been al-
ready proposed by Donaghue (2002, p. 9). Donaghue shows, however, that the conven-
tional approach has been to classify assets as owned by the concessionaire during the
term of the concession. One exception is the auditor-general of New South Wales in
Australia, who determined that the asset and liabilities of privately ﬁnanced bulk-water
treatment plants belonged to the public sector’s balance sheet.23
2.3 Accounting of PPPs by government entities
AccordingtoHemmingetal.(2005),thereisahierarchyofgovernmentaccountingstan-
dards. At the highest level there is the International Public Sector Accounting Stan-
dard (IPSAS). When there is no rule in the IPSAS covering an issue, government entities
should comply with the International Financing Reporting Standards (IFRS) under the
interpretation of the International Accounting Standards (IAS). The big issue concern-
ing PPPs is how to incorporate them into the government accounts. Eurostat (2004) has
made recommendations based on who bears the construction, availability and demand
risks. If the private partner bears at least two of these three sources of risk, including
among them the construction risk, Eurostat recommends that assets built by PPPs be
classiﬁed as nongovernmental and therefore recorded off the balance sheet. This does
not account for the fact that PPP contracts are assumed to assign risks to the party that
can best manage them.
2.3.1 Revenue guarantees
Many PPP contracts include minimum revenue guarantees, i.e., a promise that the gov-
ernment will pay the difference between the user fee revenue generated by the project
and a predetermined revenue ﬂow. Accounting for revenue guarantees has proven difﬁ-
cult, and while there is a literature on the topic, there is no consensus on how to incor-
porate them into the public accounts.24 Here we argue that guarantees can also be used
to elude spending limits.
In Engel et al. (2007) we show that revenue guarantees correspond to (contingent)
subsidiesfortheconcessionaires. Inadditiontotheseissues, inmanycountriesguaran-
teesarepoorlydocumented, aswehavealreadymentioned. Moreover, sinceguarantees
depend on the state of demand for the project, there is no consensus on how to deal
dent of whether the source of payments is the public budget or revenues generated by the project.
23Harris (1998), cited in Irwin (2007, p. 113)
24See, for example, Hemming et al. (2005), Irwin (2007).
15with the associated risk. Most importantly, as Hemming (2005, p. 40) notes, under cur-
rent accounting standards for government entities, many future obligations will remain
hidden. Forexample,undercashaccountingforgovernmententities,guaranteesareap-
parent only when they are paid, in which case they appear as current expenditure. And
under accrual accounting for government entities, a guarantee is recorded as a liabil-
ity only if the government considers that the probability of making a payment is higher
than 0.5 and can make a reasonable estimate of the amount to be paid. In that case the
liability is formally recognized by creating a provision, but this is a ﬁnancial manage-
ment decision that is not covered by the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual.25
Therefore, unless the government makes a provision and sets funds aside, guarantees
are recorded only when they are called.
2.3.2 Guarantees and spending caps
The previous analysis shows that a guarantee G is equivalent to additional revenue for
the concessionaire, which, if callable in period 2, can be used to elude the spending cap
in period 1. Two implications follow. First, in terms of anticipating spending, revenue
guarantees and renegotiations are almost perfect substitutes. It follows that reducing
thescopeofrenegotiationmayinducethegovernmenttoofferlargerguaranteessoasto
continue spending more than the cap, and conversely, that better accounting for guar-
antees will stimulate renegotiation. Second, the solution to avoid that guarantees be
used to overspend is the same as the solution to the renegotiation problem discussed
above: force the government to include as current spending all expenditures, both cur-
rent and future, associated with PPP investment. Thus, in general, for budgetary ac-
counting purposes, infrastructure investment under PPPs should be treated in the same
way as investments under the conventional approach.
3 Evidence from the Chilean PPP program
3.1 Concession program
AsmentionedintheIntroduction,theChileanconcessionprogramisconsideredamong
a handful of well established PPP programs (Hemming, 2005). Detailed data on conces-
sion contracts are available on the webpage of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP by
25The Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM, see IMF, 2001) “integrates ﬂows and stocks and
shifts the emphasis toward accrual reporting and balance sheets”, Hemming et al. (2005).
16its Spanish acronym) and the quality of ﬁscal accounting can be described at par with
average OECD levels.
Chilean PPPs were launched in 1993 with the El Melón tunnel concession. As shown
in Table 1, between 1993 and 2006, MOP awarded 50 PPPs: 26 roads, 10 airports, three
jails, two water reservoirs, ﬁve public transportation infrastructure projects and four
other miscellaneous projects. As shown in Table 2, however, roads are the main compo-
nent of the PPP program, as they account for 89% of the $11.3 billion invested (column
6).26,27
3.2 Renegotiations
By 2007, there hadbeen148 renegotiationsofPPPcontracts, andtherefore eachconces-
sion had been renegotiated three times on average. Renegotiations led to an increase of
$2.8 billion, or nearly one-third, in total investment, from $8.5 billion to $11.3 billion. As
can be seen from Figure 2, however, there is substantial variation among different types
of infrastructure. On average, the largest increases correspond to urban highways and
to jails, with average increments of more than 50%.
The following two examples illustrate how the government has used renegotiations
to circumvent Congressional approval for increased expenditures.
The rainwater collectors In 2001 there was ﬂooding in Santiago, which led to politi-
cal pressures on the government to invest in main collectors that would drain the rain
watersfromﬂood-proneareas. Sincethegovernmentwasunwillingtoobtaintheneces-
saryresourcesfromthebudgetorthroughincreasedindebtedness,itdecidedtorenego-
tiate the contracts of the urban highways scheduled for construction so that they would
build the drains. The sums involved were hundreds of millions of dollars and required
changes to the contracts of three urban concessions during the construction phase. The
initial payments for the additional works were scheduled to begin several years in the
future.
The San Antonio Bypass The main port of Chile was hampered by the fact that trucks
had to go through the city of San Antonio to reach the port. The government decided to
add a special access route to the port that bypassed the city. There were three options
26Chile’s GDP is currently about $160 billion, and at the time of completion of the main projects, these
represented about 10% of GDP .
27A detailed description of the data base can be found in Engel et al. (2009).
17to ﬁnance the project: i) to fund it with ﬁscal resources, ii) through an independent
self-ﬁnanced tolled concession or iii) as a non-tolled extension to the Route 78, from
Santiago to San Antonio. The then President had promised the city, while a candidate,
that he would not impose a toll on the proposed access. Even though the government
had ample access to the international credit markets, it decided to renegotiate the con-
tract, valuing the 8 km project at around US$ 45 million. The payment consisted in a
substantial increase in tolls, and a further increase in 2012. It is not clear whether the
expected revenue from increased tolls corresponds to the value of the project.
3.3 How and what is renegotiated?
The Chileanconcessionslaw allows fortwo possible channels torenegotiate concession
contracts. In a bilateral renegotiation either MOP or the concessionaire can initiate the
process and bargain until they reach an acceptable agreement. The agreement is then
formalized via a publicly available annex to the original contract, which describes the
aspects that were renegotiated, values additional investments, indicates the timing of
additionalpaymentsandstatesthesourcesoffundsthatwillbeusedtopaytheamounts
that were renegotiated.
Contracts can also be modiﬁed by the concessionaire appealing to a panel. These
appeals usually occur if the government and the concessionaire cannot reach an agree-
ment during the bilateral renegotiation. There is one panel per PPP, each with three
members, one designated by MOP, another by the concessionaire and the third, who
must be a lawyer, named by mutual agreement. In a ﬁrst stage the panel attempts to
conciliate the positions of both parties. If the conciliation stage fails, the panel arbi-
trates between the positions.28 There are no appeals to the panel’s decisions, except for
procedural issues. Under the current Chilean concessions law, the government cannot
present a dispute with the concessionaire to the panel.
Bilateralrenegotiationsarereviewedbyothergovernmentagencies,inparticularthe
Finance Ministry, but are not subject to independent review. By contrast, renegotiations
before a panel are subject to the examination of outsiders (even though they are chosen
by MOP and the concessionaire).
Moredetailedinformationisavailableforbilateralrenegotiationsthanforrenegotia-
tionsbeforeapanel. Inparticular,abreakupoftheamountrenegotiatedintohowmuch
goes to pay for existing infrastructure and how much for additions is only available for
28Formally, the panels operate as conciliation panels in the ﬁrst stage and as arbitration panels in the
second stage of the process.
18bilateral renegotiations.
As can be seen in Figure 3, there were 78 (out of 148) bilateral renegotiations, while
the rest were appeals to the panel. Hence, bilateral renegotiations represent little more
than 50% of all processes. Nevertheless, 83% of the renegotiated amounts, correspond-
ing to $2.3 billion, were awarded in bilateral renegotiations. Of this amount, 84%, or
$1.96 billion, were designated as additional investments, with the remaining $360 mil-
lion, were designated as additional payments for originally contracted works.29 Accord-
ing to the records, 66 of the 78 bilateral renegotiations were initiated by MOP.30
3.4 When do renegotiations occur?
AswepointedoutintheIntroduction,industryparticipantsoftendefendrenegotiations
by arguing that PPPs are long-term, incomplete contracts, and that conditions change
over the life of the concession. For example, trafﬁc on a road may grow faster than ex-
pected, and this could warrant building additional lanes of a highway before the end of
the concession. In contrast, in our model renegotiations occur during construction.
Figure 4 shows that 51 of 78 bilateral renegotiations, corresponding to 78% of the to-
tal amount renegotiated, took place during construction, which is evidence against the
interpretation of renegotiations as the response to long-term, incomplete contracts. By
contrast, less than half of the $490 million awarded by arbitration panels occurred dur-
ing construction. Evidently, our data is censored, because most concessions have not
completed their term. Nevertheless, the point is that renegotiations during construc-
tion are signiﬁcant, a fact that is hard to rationalize under the long term incomplete
contractsinterpretationofrenegotiation,whereasitispredictedbythemodelpresented
in this paper.
3.5 The timing of compensations
Our analysis implies that future administrations bear the cost of renegotiations by in-
cumbents. Figure 5 shows that only 35% of the $2.3 billion that were awarded through
bilateral renegotiations was paid by the incumbent administration. Most of the remain-
ing amount will be borne by future administrations, and a ﬁnal fraction by users, via
higher tolls and contract extension.
29Wewereunabletodeterminethedivisionintothesetwocomponentsinthecaseofarbitrations, given
the available information.
30Industry insiders suggest that it is politically more acceptable if it looks as if MOP rather than the
concessionaire starts the renegotiation process.
19It is interesting to contrast bilateral renegotiations with arbitration panels. In that
case, 61% of the awards were paid by the administration involved in the dispute.
3.6 Renegotiation caps
When a concession is auctioned in Chile, ﬁrms must submit an estimate of the cost of
the project as part of their bid. The current Chilean concessions law states that addi-
tional investments added during the term of the concession cannot exceed 15% of this
estimate,unlesstheconcessioncontractspeciﬁesitexplicitly. Ofthe50concessioncon-
tracts, 39 established ad-hoc caps. During construction the caps range from 5% to 15%,
and from 10% to 30% for the whole term of the concession. This is an attempt to limit
renegotiations; it is interesting to examine the effectiveness of caps.
Table 3 shows data for those concession contracts that exceeded their cap. In each
case, we compute the dollar value of the limit on renegotiations, and then compare the
total limit over all the concessions with the total amount effectively renegotiated.
Column 1 indicates that 16 concessions exceeded their caps during construction,
and 11 had exceeded their overall renegotiation caps by 2007. During construction, ag-
gregate caps were $367 million; but renegotiations were $1.6 billion, i.e., 4.3 times the
predeﬁned limit. During the term of the concession total caps added up to $483 million;
while the amounts renegotiated were $1.6 billion. We conclude that caps are ineffective
tools to limit renegotiation.
3.7 Taking Stock
Combiningbilateralandpanelrenegotiations,wehavethat73%ofthetotalamountwas
renegotiated shortly after the concession was auctioned, that is during the construc-
tion phase. This is consistent with the prediction of our model and inconsistent with
the interpretation of renegotiations as the response to long-term, incomplete contracts.
Furthermore, only 40%ofthe$2.8 billionthatwereawardedthroughrenegotiationswas
paidbytheincumbentadministration,suggestingthatrenegotiationshelpgovernments
increase expenditures by circumventing budgetary controls.
For those renegotiations where data is available, 84% of the sums contracted were
designated as additional investments, with the remaining 16% designated as additional
payments for works included in the original contract. This is consistent with lowballing
by ﬁrms in the original auction, as suggested by our model.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the predictions of our model hold to a larger extent for
20bilateral renegotiations than for panel renegotiations. We do not have information to
account for the endogeneity of the choice of renegotiation and therefore leave possible
explanations for this ﬁnding for future research.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that, from the point of view of incumbent governments, PPPs have the
advantage of allowing them to exceed spending limits. This is because poor accounting
standards allow governments to use renegotiations to increase spending without over-
sight. This feature of renegotiations leads to observable predictions, namely that (i) in a
competitivemarket,ﬁrmslowballtheiroffers,expectingtobreakeventhroughrenegoti-
ation,(ii)renegotiationscompensatelowballingandaddadditionalexpenditure,(iii)the
government uses renegotiation to increase spending and shift the burden of payments
to future administrations, (iv) there are signiﬁcant renegotiations during construction.
We use data on Chilean renegotiations of concessions to examine these predictions and
ﬁnd that the data are consistent with the results of our model.
Wealsoshowthatasimplechangetoﬁscalaccountingcouldeliminatethisproblem,
namely by including PPP investment, including renegotiations, as current expenditure.
On the other hand, the data show that alternatives, such as contractual limits, are inef-
fective in that role.
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23APPENDIX
Proof of Result 3.
Assume the ﬁrm bids B for building infrastructure 1
2, so that it lowballs by ÁÆ 1
2 ¡B,
To determine the equilibrium value of Á we analyze the renegotiation, conditional on Á.

























Implicit differentiation w.r.t. ² and R implies:
u0(1














Total surplus to be split during renegotiation equals:
[R ¡²]ÅM2(²,R;Á), (14)
where the term in square brackets represents the ﬁrm’s proﬁt while the second term
corresponds to the government’s monetary gain. Maximizing total surplus w.r.t. ² and R














31A similar proof holds if we work with the ﬁrst period monetary equivalent.
24Imposing the zero proﬁt condition we have R Æ ÁÅ². Substituting this expression for
R in (15) and comparing with (5) shows that the equilibrium value for infrastructure
contracted during the renegotiation, ²¤, satisﬁes ²¤ Æ I¤
1 ¡ 1
2. The government therefore
attains its optimum.
We complete the proof by deriving (10). If the ﬁrm’s surplus share is ®, then
Á¤ ÆR ¡²¤ Æ®[R ¡²¤ÅM2(²¤,R;Á)]Æ®[Á¤ÅM2(²¤,Á¤Å²¤;Á¤)],





2(²¤,Á¤Å²¤;Á¤). It follows from (11) that Á¤ÅM¤









Using (16) to substitute Á¤/® for Á¤ÅM¤









    
Highways     
    
Pan American Highway (Route 5)  Urban highways  Jails 
    
 1. Los Vilos-La Serena [1997, 25] [3, 0]  22. Vespucio-El Salto-Kennedy [2004, 30] [1, 0]  37. Grupo 1 (Iquique-La Serena-Rancagua) [2002, 23] [0,2] 
 2. Santiago-Los Vilos [1996, 23] [3, 7]  23. Américo Vespucio Nor Poniente [2002, 30] [2, 0]  38. Grupo 2
 (Concepción-Antofagasta)
2 [2002, 22] [0, 1] 
 3. Santiago-Talca [1998, 25] [5, 10]  24. Américo Vespucio Sur [2001, 38] [ 2, 0]  39. Grupo 3 (Santiago1-Valdivia- Puerto Montt) [2004, 23] [1, 1] 
 4. Talca-Chillán [1996, 19] [5, 3]  25. Sistema Norte-Sur [2000, 30] [ 4, 0]   
 5. Chillán-Collipulli [1997, 23] [3, 0]  26. Sistema Oriente-Poniente [2000, 30] [5, 0]  Water reservoirss 
 6. Collipulli-Temuco [1998, 25] [4, 1]     
 7. Temuco-Río Bueno [1997, 25] [3, 1]    40. Convento Viejo [2005, 25] [2, 0] 
 8. Río Bueno- Puerto Montt [1997, 25] [2, 2]  Other concessions  41. El Bato de Illapel
2 [2001, 30] [0, 3] 
     
Interurban highways  Airports  Urban public transportation 
     
 9. Acceso Nor Oriente a Santiago [2003, 40] [0, 0]  27. Arturo Merino Benítez, (Santiago) [1997, 15] [2, 9]  42. Conexión vial Suiza-Las Rejas [2005, 5] [1, 0] 
10. Acceso Norte a Concepción [1995, 28] [0, 3]  28. Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (Punta Arenas) [2000, 9] [1, 0]  43. Corredor Av. Santa Rosa [2006, 14] [0, 0] 
11. Acceso aeropuerto AMB, Santiago [1996, 12] [1, 2]  29. Carriel Sur (Concepción) [1999, 16] [ 0, 1]  44. Estación de intercambio La Cisterna [2004, 22] [0, 1] 
12. Autopista Santiago-San Antonio [1995, 23] [4, 4]  30. Cerro Moreno ( Antofagasta) [1999, 10] [1, 1]  45. Estación de intercambio Quinta Normal
2 [2004, 24] [1, 1] 
13. Camino de la Madera [1994, 25] [1, 1]  31. Chacalluta (Arica) [2004, 15] [1, 0]  46. Estaciones de trasbordo [2006, 15] [0, 0] 
14. Camino internacional Ruta 60 Ch. [2002, 32] [2, 1]  32. Diego Aracena ( Iquique) [1995, 12] [1, 0]   
15. Santiago-Colina-Los Andes [1996, 28] [3, 2]  33. El Loa (Calama) [1997, 12] [1, 0]  Others 
16. Nogales –Puchuncaví [1995, 22] [1, 2]  34. El Tepual (Puerto Montt) [1995, 12] [2, 0]   
17. Santiago-Valparaíso-Viña [1998, 25] [6, 3]  35. La Florida (La Serena) [1998, 10] [0, 1]  47. Centro de Justicia de Santiago [2004, 23] [0, 0] 
18. Red vial Litoral Central [2000, 30] [1, 2]  36. Regional (Copiapó) [2002, 20] [0, 0]  48. Estadio techado Parque O´Higgins [2004, 20] [1, 0] 
19. Ruta interportuaria Talcahuano-Penco [2002, 42] [2, 1]    49. Plaza de la Ciudadanía [2004, 30] [1, 0] 
20. Túnel El Melón [1993, 23] [0, 3]    50. Landport (Los Andes) [2004, 20] [0, 0] 
21. Variante Melipilla [2001, 30] [1, 1]     
    
Notes: (1) In brackets: [year of the original concession contract, term (years)] [number of bilateral renegotiations, number of conciliations and arbitrations ]. (2) The project was cancelled.   26
Table 2 
Investment and renegotiations in Chilean PPPs 































          
Pan American Highway  8/28/24
2  23.8 2,875.43 843.46 3,718.89 0.33 
Interurban  13/22/25  26.9 2,118.06 425.63 2,543.68 0.23 
Urban  5/12/0  31.6 2,420.86  1,331.56  3,752.42 0.33 
            
Highways  26/62/49 26.9  7,414.35 2,600.64  10,014.99 0.89 
            
Airports  10/9/12  13.2  383.94 48.08 432.02  0.04 
Jails  3/1/4  22.5 221.40 113.41 334.82 0.03 
Water reservoirs  2/2/3  27.5  120.00 24.45 144.45  0.01 
Public transport  5/2/2  14.7  156.81 25.82 182.64  0.02 
Others  4/2/0  23.2 168.72  0.97  169.69 0.02 
            
Other concessions  24/16/21 17.5  1,050.87 212.73 1,263.61 0.11 
          
Total
 or average  50/78/70 22.4  8,465.22 2,813.38  11,278.59  1 
       
Notes: (1) Includes cancelled projects. (2) Projects/bilateral renegotiations/arbitration panel. (3) Excludes cancelled projects. (4) Includes the 
amounts which were paid to cancel three concessions.    27
Table 3 
Renegotiation caps and bilateral renegotiations 






Concessions that exceed 
the investment limit 
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Pan American Highway  4  3  80.07  158.65  396.99  396.55  4.96  2.50 
Interurban 5  2  69.90  34.81  163.36  45.33  2.34  1.30 
Urban 5  5  190.49  285.74  980.52  1,132.41  5.15  3.96 
               
Highways 14  10  340.47  479.20  1,540.87  1,574.29  4.53  3.29 
               
Airports 1  1  18.40  3.93  20.19  4.88  1.10  1.24 
Jails 0  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -  - 
Water reservoirs  1  0  8.40  0.00  10.29  0.00  1.23  - 
Public transport  0  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -  - 
Others 0  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -  - 
              
Other concessions  2  1  26.80  3.93  30.48  4.88  1.1  1.24 
             
Total   16  11  367.27  483.13  1,571.35  1,579.18  4.3  3.3 
              
Notes: (1) We only count those concessions that surpassed investment caps. (2) Includes only those amounts added in bilateral renegotiations which add investments not included 
in the original contract.  Figure 1 
Timing of the infrastructure process 
t = 2 
t = 1 
t = 2 
t = 1  Congress sets spending cap  1 I . 
Election. 
Incumbent procures  1 1 I I ≤ ; 
construction company builds. 
Incumbent issues  1 1 T I D − =  and 
pays  1 I  to the  
construction company. 
Government procures  1 1 I − ; 
construction company builds. 
Government collects taxes, pays 
1 1 I −  to the construction 
company and repays debt D. 
(a) Conventional provision  (b) PPP provision 
Congress sets spending cap  1 I . 
Government issues  1 1 T P D − =  
and pays  1 1 I P ≤  to the 
concessionaire. 
Contract is renegotiated; 
additional payment R is agreed, 
against building ε ; contract 
} ; { 1 ε + + I R B signed. 
Election. 
Government procures  ) ( 1 R B+ − ; 
construction company builds. 
Government pays  ) ( 1 R B+ − to 
the construction company,  
1 ) ( P R B − +  to the concessionaire  
and repays debt D. 
Government collects taxes  2 T . 
Government collects taxes  1 T . 
Government collects taxes  2 T . 
Government collects taxes  1 T . 
Firms bid B for building  1 1 I I ≤ . 
Contract  } ; { 1 I B  signedFigure 2




















































































































 Figure 3 
How and what is renegotiated 
Renegotiations (148) 
$ 2.8 billion 
(100%) 
Bilateral (78/66) 
$ 2.3 billion 
(83%)
Arbitration (70) 
$ 490 million 
(17%) 
Additional payments 
$ 360 million 
(16%)
Additional investment 
$ 2.0 billion 
(84%)Figure 4 
When are PPPs renegotiated? 
Renegotiations 
$ 2.8 billion 
(100%) 
Bilateral (78) 
$ 2.3 billion 
(83%) 
Arbitration (70) 
$ 490 million 
(17%) 
After construction (27) 
$ 500 million 
(22%) 
During construction (51) 
$ 1.8 billion 
(78%) 
After construction (39) 
$ 265 million 
(54%) 
During construction (31) 
$ 225 million 
(46%) Figure 5 
Who pays when PPPs are renegotiated?  
Renegotiations 
$ 2.8 billion 
(100%) 
Bilateral 
$ 2.3 billion 
(83%) 
Arbitration 
$ 490 million 
(17%) 
Future administrations or users 
$ 1.5 billion 
(65%) 
Current administration 
$ 812 million 
(35%) 
Future administrations and users 
$ 191 million 
(39%) 
Current administration 
$ 299 million 
(61%) 